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I. Network neutrality in the European context 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Ontologically, ‘network neutrality’ is a political and not a legal term. It has been 
introduced in the legal literature by US antitrust scholars and is by now well established and 
consensually used. It constitutes the premise of original destiny of the telecommunications 
infrastructure as a conduit of all relevant data with (virtually) no interference of incumbent 
into this process. Because of its political roots, it does not convey the literal meaning of 
neutrality. Most actors on both sides of the debate agree that not every data has to be 
transmitted without any prioritisation. For instance, the succession of e-mail, banking and 
security services is always prioritised over other internet applications. 
 
After two decades of the Community liberalisation policy in the telecommunications 
area, the domestic European markets have become relatively integrated and disclosed. This 
gives the chance for the world wide leaders of the electronic communications industry to enter 
into the regulatory homogenous and rapidly growing European telecommunications 
environment without needing to comply with the twenty-seven different administrative 
regimes of the EU member states. The opening of the European telecommunications industry 
is a long-term process, which has to be seen along its three dimensions; that is, incumbents 
versus new entrants, domestic telcos versus their European vis-à-vis, and European telcos 
versus foreign competitors. The history of the interactions between these three groups of 
telecommunications actors shows many examples of their fierce contest in. and mostly for, the 
markets. Every telco strives to promote its own commercial interests, often simultaneously 
supporting different, even controversial, theoretical approaches in the different markets: from 
preserving strong regulation to complete de-regulation; from maintaining a monopoly position 
to fostering competition; from hard protectionism to libertarian market disclosure. The 
position of the companies depends on their status in each relevant market: as incumbents or as 
new entrants; domestic or European; European or foreign. However, there is an area in which 
they reach practically unconditional consent: they are unanimous in relation to network 
neutrality. Among the companies which represent the opposite side of this theoretical debate, 
the situation is similar as well.   
 
Until the moment of rapid growth of internet technologies, which provides high speed 
traffic over the new FTTx networks -and, consequently, the transmission of large-sized files 
and applications-, the discussion on network neutrality had only a theoretical dimension. With 
the fast development of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies, Internet Protocol 
Television (IPTV), video-on-demand and movie-downloading services (otherwise large-sized 
files and applications), the amount of traffic over the network has been growing exponentially. 
Concurrent to this process, there has been a substantial development of the infrastructure, 
which can now be managed gradually by Internet Service Providers (ISP). In practice, this 
means that ISPs, who are often at the same time the owners and administrators of the 
networks, can ‘range’ the traffic speed of different internet applications.   
 
Because of digital convergence and systematic elimination of the frontiers between 
infrastructure, platform and content of the internet, many ISP are beginning to consider 
launching for their users the provision of different kinds of content services under different 
traffic speed (two-tier Internet). Concurrently, some big internet companies are launching 
their own wired and wireless networks, like Google in San Francisco.  
 
As soon as ISP acquired the technical abilities to ‘range’ the traffic of different 
applications and, most importantly, of different content providers, they started to consider the 
possibility of providing high-speed premium services for content operators interested in 
instantaneous delivery of their services. This option is particularly important for such time-
sensitive applications as broadcasting of live sports events, video conferences and some other 
communication services. Under such conditions, internet speed became a killer application for 
attracting new clients and gaining substantially higher revenues. There are two hypothetical 
models of applying this premium speed services: on one hand, assigning such extra-speed 
capacity to other content-providers for additional fee and, on the other hand, vertical 
integration of ISP with certain content-provider and offering content services on its own.  
 
The merely technical capability of ISP to charge their clients -to be understood as 
charging on both sides of traffic, that is download or consumers and upload or content 
providers- brought on commercially justifiable apprehensions in the content-providing 
internet industries. Services which content providers have traditionally received by simply 
paying for upload speed and data capacity at the upstream level may now only be obtained by 
these companies for additional payments at the download level, depending on the real amount 
of users. This scenario appears to be only hypothetical, since nobody is allowed to degrade 
the speed of some particular content or application. Besides, it would never be possible from 
the political or freedom of speech and commercial or cannibalisation of existing business 
model points of view. However, the growing popularity of premium speed services would 
indirectly leave in the cold those content-providing companies who will continue to rely upon 
merely average ‘non-discriminatory’ speed of data transmission.  
 
So, does prioritisation actually mean discrimination? The answer to this rather 
philosophical question definitely depends on the initial position of the inquirer. As it always 
happens with debates in the area of competition law and regulatory policy, each party tries to 
obtain the cheval de bataille of its rectitude; namely, benefits for consumers and improvement 
of the general economic welfare.  
 
This situation impelled content providers to launch a wide-ranging political campaign 
on network neutrality, with the intent to preserve the existing status quo, by means of 
introducing broad public discussions and implementing the relevant legislative framework. 
The epicenter of these debates was initially situated in the United States, where this topic 
received tremendous public coverage and scientific conceptualisation. However, nowadays, 
the network neutrality concept is becoming increasingly more popular in other jurisdictions, 
particularly in the European Union and Japan, where these debates are still in their infancy.  
 
Leaving aside such controversial issues as the level of censorship, privacy, and 
copyrights protection of the transmitted content, local internet service providers are apparently 
aware of their customers needs, at least as much as world-wide content providers are. 
Therefore, they will never jeopardise the services of high-speed data delivery by blocking or 
slowing down certain applications. However, one must recognise that, with some minor 
exceptions, providers of broadband internet services are usually monopolists in the local 
markets and their dependence upon content-creating companies is significantly less than vice 
versa. Does this mean that their business practices need to be regulated by sector specific 
instruments, such as compulsory access or neutral traffic requirement, or are the traditional 
mechanisms of ex post competition law reasonable and sufficient in the present context? What 
is the legal difference between the American and European approaches to network neutrality 
and where exactly is it situated? These are two central questions that this paper will attempt to 
tackle.  
 
B. Jurisdictional concerns, quo warranto  
 
Telecommunications law was not originally supposed to have a European Community 
dimension. The founding fathers of European integration laid down prima facie explicit 
clauses in the legal foundation of the European Community, reserving telecommunications to 
the national regulatory regimes. Indeed, at the time, the social and political status of 
telecommunications was considered as one of the strategic domains of internal affairs.  
 
Thus, Article 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community stipulates:  
 
In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which member states grant special or exclusive 
rights, member states shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules 
contained in this treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89.  
 
Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the 
character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this treaty, in 
particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must 
not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community.  
 
The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this article and shall, where necessary, 
address appropriate directives or decisions to member states. 
 
Neither literal nor historical interpretation of these provisions gives us a ground for 
questioning the original intentions of the member states. The initial political will consisted in 
reserving the telecommunications policy for domestic regulation.  
 
Nevertheless, in the course of time, the interpretation of Article 86 has been 
hermeneutically moved towards substantial an expansion of the Community’s competences in 
the present domain. Accordingly, teleological and systemic modes of interpretation provide a 
clear picture of the ‘genuine mission’ of the treaty and classify telecommunications as one of 
the most important European policy. The European Commission has been one of the most 
active proponents of such a shift of paradigm in the evaluation of the status of 
telecommunications policy in the economic constellation of the EC. This pro-European 
approach was ultimately legitimised by the judicial opinions of the Community’s courts, 
videlicet in the relevant case law.  
 
Technically, the self-contradictory provisions of Article 86 might be interpreted in 
different ways, both in favour and against of the parties to the present dispute. Under these 
circumstances, the decisive factor is to be found in the general purpose of European 
integration, which is based on striving to complete the single internal market; that is, on 
Articles 15, 26, 47 § 2, 49, 80, 93 and 95. This aim serves as a common denominator for the 
arguments of both parties. Not surprisingly, the reference to the overall value of market 
integration sorted all things out and ended up presenting the telecommunications policy as 
genuinely European.   
 
C. Libéralisation! Harmonisation! Concurrence! 
 
The European telecommunications policy was supposed to be governed by three major 
principles: liberalisation, harmonisation and competition. These three maxims directly 
correspond to the three core European meta-tasks; namely, completing the internal market, 
setting out Community-wide uniform social and economic regulatory system, and fine-tuning 
the optimal competitive institutional environment.  
 
It is noteworthy that, although these three objectives all constitute important elements 
of European economic welfare, they also quite often contradict themselves. The main problem 
lies in their ontology and methodology. Traditional ex post competition rules and antitrust law 
are graduate and predictable. They provide for incumbents substantial amount of legal 
certainty. In contrast, the ad hoc nature of regulations, which constitute the main instruments 
of liberalisation and harmonisation, are rather based upon the rationale exitus acta probat. 
 
There are philosophical doubts as well about the correctness of the term liberalisation, 
which in this particular context would actually mean “liberalisation through regulation” and 
not “liberalisation from regulation”. From the perspective of negative freedom, such a 
formula constitutes a contradictio in terminis. This being said, proponents of a positive 
conception of freedom consider volitional interference and creativity as an indispensable 
component of any genuine form of freedom. In the context of the European 
telecommunications regulatory regime, liberalisation consequently means an aim, whereas 
the methods of reaching this aim are far from liberal and include, for instance, limitation of 
profitability, common carriage obligations or compulsory access.  
 
The ontological legacy of European telecommunications based upon original state 
ownership provides an additional, although rather rhetorical, argument for regulatory 
interference by the Commission. In the course of the privatisation of most European 
telecommunications giants, the permanent implicit emphasis has been put on the fact that the 
entire network infrastructure has been built by the sweat of nation’s brow; a consideration, 
which can be euphemistically interpreted along the lines that the industry will continue to be 
regulated at least for a while.  
 
This is particularly important since, under the current European regulatory regime, 
even telecommunications companies without significant market power -as opposed to the 
rules defining the dominant position in ex post competition legislation- may be obliged to 
provide in certain cases for their competitors adequate access to infrastructure and services. 
The Commission recognises the exceptional character of such compulsory remedies, but 
proposes to preserve this practice in the new regulatory framework for telecommunications. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure the consistent application of this condition and to avoid the 
imposition of inconsistent obligations without a market analysis, it is proposed to harmonise 
this procedure on the Community level. Supposedly, this would prevent the risk of over-
regulation and a fragmentation of the internal market through the imposition of inconsistent 
obligations. The procedure of cooperation between Commission and NRA is provided by 
Article 7 of the Directive on a common regulatory framework (2002/21/EC). It requires NRA 
to conduct a national and Community consultation on the relevant regulatory measures they 
intend to take. The Commission may issue comments and, under certain circumstances, block 
the proposed regulations.  
 
D. European policy of limited profitability  
 
On the road to privatisation of previously state-owned telecommunication companies 
in Europe, the most popular form of regulation was the limitation of the investment rate. This 
basically implied post-selling state’s control over incumbent’s tariff policy by means of 
requirements to restrict the scope of its returns and aggregate profitability. According to these 
conditions, commercial incentives for telecommunication companies and their subsidiaries 
should be limited by general revenue caps. This presupposes the possibility to gain solely a 
‘proportional’ margin of profits, which should take into account the interests of direct, 
potential and (maybe) even hypothetical competitors.  
 
Limitation of profitability ratios is a rather objectionable and controversial instrument 
of telecommunications policy. From a theoretical perspective, it raises substantial doubts 
about the appropriate functioning of the free market, by not only restricting the genuine 
intention of service providers to render access to facility at the highest possible price but also 
confining the inherent business intentions of the incumbents to innovate and improve the 
quality of the telecommunications services.  
 
Since the policy of limited profitability applies for the most part uniformly to the 
whole industry, often without appropriate differentiations between the various segments of 
telecommunications businesses, the sporadic benefits of such regulatory interventions are 
considerably degraded by economic damages, which are raised from unnecessary market 
limitations in other allied areas of the industry. Furthermore, these restrictions are quite often 
applied to markets where the incumbent neither abuses nor even holds the dominant position 
or where the competition functions well and there is no rational necessity whatsoever for 
regulatory intervention by public authorities.  
 
Because of the complexity and the rapid changes that occur when offering different 
services inside the telecommunications industry, it would be unrealistic to predict the 
existence of a well-differentiated ranging system of regulation, which fully takes into account 
the specificity of the various markets and submarkets; thereby, providing mobile and efficient 
operational regime.  
 
In addition, the limited profitability policy of telecommunication companies does not 
bring any substantial benefit to the consumers. These interventionist regulatory mechanisms 
may serve only for reaching short-term and fairly marginal advantages, because in the long 
and middle-term perspective the lack of incumbent incentives to innovate together with their 
intentions to structurally optimise existing formats of business in order to adjust to regulatory 
pressure cannot lead either to establishing of workable competition model within internal 
market or to improving services. Under the present system, a large amount of incumbent 
efforts are re-directed to a sophisticated parcelling into different entities or affiliated 
enterprises in order to comply with legal requirements,1 virtually sharing gained profits 
between different pockets of the same jacket.  
 
Another important disadvantage of limited profitability rules in the 
telecommunications sector is that they deform the fundamental notion of regulatory policy, 
impelling beliefs upon dependent companies about the constant character of such well-
disposed regulatory climate on the relevant market. The legacy of regulatory over-protection 
decreases abilities of dependent companies to compete under the conditions of workable 
competition. In return, it incites them to lobby the legislation and support the general political 
atmosphere in favour of the conservation of the current state of affair in the industry. One can 
easily find persuasive arguments for regulatory protection, especially if the success or even 
mere existence of the dependent companies is at stake. In this situation, there is direct 
evidence that, by definition, the provisional character of each ex ante regulatory interference 
slowly but surely transforms into a permanent state of play for the whole telecommunications 
industry.   
 
For all intents and purposes, regulation plays the part of first violin in many domains 
of public community affairs, including those related to the economy. It is indispensable inter 
alia in the relations of establishment and registration, fiscal and financial control, as well as in 
a range of other inspecting and administrative matters. Furthermore, it is inevitable in 
securing performance of common carriage through the provision of universal services. 
However, the primary task of regulatory policy in the area of market fine-tuning is to 
                                                 
1
 This remark does not intend to contest or otherwise cast doubts on the probable existence of some genuine 
competition between companies owned by the same person (e.g., by accounting separation). On the contrary, 
there are sufficient evidences to believe that, in some industries, ownership does not play decisive role with 
regard to competition (e.g., rivalry for audience among TV-channels, which legally belong to one media 
holding).  
establish, improve or modify competition in the relevant market(s) and, in no circumstances, 
to substitute it by nearly command-and-control practices, such as the policy of limited 
profitability.  
 
The references of the proponents of the limited profitability policy are based to a large 
extent on the fact that newly established competitive markets of telecommunication services 
are dependant upon regulatory interference, as they would otherwise be unbearably pressured 
by the incumbents and forced to abandon the market. This presumption is increasingly gaining 
the status of an axiom in the industry. Another reasonable argument is based upon the 
widespread -although rather deductive- experience of abusive monopolistic behaviour of the 
incumbent in the presumably unregulated environment. In an ideally modulated world, 
competition in the network industries is a rather temporal issue, considering that 
monopolisation of the market is almost indispensable in the end. As the common adage goes, 
the winner gets all. Under these circumstances, the successful incumbent would be motivated 
to operate according to the paradigmatic winner-gets-all formula. This is precisely the reason 
why both ex post (competition laws) and ex ante (sector specific regulations) regulatory 
policies are called upon.  
 
As a general rule, the most important instrument for public regulation of the market 
economy appears to be competition law. Because of its existential universality and legal 
conformity, this tool is precisely considered as a commonly acceptable raison d’être of 
moderate and predictable market regulation. Competition law has its well-elaborated 
jurisprudence; it is based upon judicial principles and case-law. In legal reasoning, there is 
much more about law here, then about competition. Hence, competition law is an instrument, 
which provides a substantial amount of legal certainty and refers to principles of law or at 
least does accept them as a value.  
 
The ex ante regulatory instruments of market regulation are not characterised by 
predictability and legal continuity. They are fully tied to the political context and they are 
adopted by executive authorities as rules rather than as principles. Ex ante instruments are 
much more flexible and easy to change. Their mission as regulators of competition lies in 
establishing short-term contextual tasks in accordance with everyday political necessity. The 
legal nature of ex ante regulation is consequentialist concerning the results achieved in the 
market. Its algorithm consists in the claim that sector specific regulations are temporal tools 
for matching market failures, which cannot be fixed by ex post regulation. In course of time of 
their legal validity, they may directly contradict competition law as ex post regulation. Yet, 
they would still apply in spite of this formal discrepancy with competition law and even the 
plausible higher place occupied by the latter in the formal legal hierarchy.  
 
E. Local loop unbundling  
 
The European policy in the area of network neutrality has to be seen in close 
connection to the approach of the Commission towards the issue of local loop unbundling. 
The regulatory regime of the latter may be transposed in the future to the former, since both 
are directly related to the regulation of the appropriate managing of networks and both 
eventually provide very high obligations for the incumbents.  
 
Local loops constitute physical wired intermediary between telephone exchange 
central offices and end-users telecommunications lines. The essence of local loop unbundling 
policy is based on granting to incumbent competitors the fair and non-discriminatory use of 
the facility of monopolist. The technical characteristics of local loops do not permit their 
duplication under economically reasonable terms. Naturally, the opinions of the main industry 
players are divided, depending on the factual power in the markets of networks 
interconnections. As a result, companies that possess local loops -virtually, always 
monopolistically- are insisting upon their genuine property rights to operate their own 
facilities, whereas new entrants and companies who do not have well-developed network 
infrastructure refer to their right to compete and ask for the permission to use local loops 
under the same conditions as incumbent affiliated companies do.  
 
Another more radical variant of local loop unbundling consists in bit stream access, 
which essentially is an entrance to the market of electronic communications made by a 
company which possesses no infrastructure equipment at all. Neither the current nor the 
reformed European telecommunications regulatory framework does explicitly maintain 
compulsory provision of bit stream access. However, according to the Directive on access and 
interconnection (2002/19/EC), incumbents are obliged to provide different forms of access 
under transparent and non-discriminatory terms and conditions. Hence, a proactive 
interpretation of this provision may lead to compulsory access to the network by competitors, 
if such access has been made for at least one of them. According to Article 1 § 3 of 
Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, “this regulation shall 
apply without prejudice to the obligations for notified operators2 to comply with the principle 
of non-discrimination, when using the fixed public telephone network in order to provide high 
speed access and transmission services to third parties in the same manner as they provide for 
their own services or to their associated companies, in accordance with Community 
provisions”. 
 
The practice of the Commission demonstrates its willingness to foster innovations in 
the bit stream markets, in particular outside of densely populated metropolitan areas. National 
regulatory authorities are required to notify their market analysis with regard to several pre-
defined markets to the Commission and one of these markets is the market of bit stream 
access.3  
 
One of the most appropriate solutions for this dilemma may be provided by the market 
itself; in particular, rapidly growing wireless technologies. In the predictable future, wireless 
connection may become an appropriate platform for high-speed transmission of data. This is 
already the case in the most technologically developed local communities around the globe. 
The economic potential of wireless communications is enormous. According to the 
Commission, the total value of services that depend already today on use of the radio 
spectrum in the EU exceeds €200 billion. Wireless has been a strong driver of economic 
growth of Europe.4 
 
Wireless technologies constitute an effective substitute to more traditional electronic 
communications. Their intensive usage would help solving existing bottleneck problems in 
the area of local loop interoperability. There are reasonable market premises to believe that, 
instead of strict compulsion to open the access for the local loops, the regulator could re-direct 
its efforts to promoting wireless technologies, fostering new entrants to adopt new business 
strategies, which would not only establish competition in the markets, but also promote 
innovations for the benefits of consumers. This approach would be particularly appropriate in 
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 Notified operators are those operators that hold significant market power.  
3
 In 2006, the Commission approved the decision of the German regulator Bundesnetzagentur to open up 
broadband markets, including very high-speed internet access (VDSL) with regards to Deutsche Telekom.  
4
 See: V. REDING, The Review 2006 of EU Telecom Rules: Strengthening Competition and Completing the 
Internal Market, Annual Meeting of BITKOM, Brussels, Bibliothèque Solvay, 27 June 2006; which expresses 
the views of a member of the European Commission responsible for the information society and the media. 
the light of the Commission efforts to liberalise the spectrum policy and to bring its regulation 
at the Community level.  
 
Since the Commission proposal for review of the European electronic communications 
framework is focused on empowering market players and giving them the necessary legal 
certainty to exercise their role of innovators, it would be both effective and consistent to 
provide them with the regulatory prerequisites for such incentives; namely, to restrict the 
commonly used practice of local loop unbundling and impel new entrants to look for their 
way to success via new wireless technologies rather then by free riding on existing facilities.   
 
II. European law of electronic communications 
 
A. Present-day regulatory regime 
 
The legislative failure to include network neutrality provisions into the 
Communications Opportunity, Promotion and Enhancement Act of 2006 gives a glimpse of 
the preliminary state of affairs in the United States. This is not the case for Europe. Indeed, 
the network neutrality issue is neither settled nor properly articulated in the European context. 
The debates over telecommunications in the EU take place under another methodological 
apparatus, with different priorities and somewhat shifted accents. Then again, it resembles the 
US situation in the clear-cut definition of the European opponents and adherents to network 
neutrality. The former contains most of ISPs, regardless of their legal property relation to the 
networks. The latter are united around the most powerful and ambitious content suppliers.  
 
Despite the strong commitment of the main European regulatory player -that is, the 
Commission- to proactive telecommunications policy, the opponents of network neutrality are 
in a more advantageous position, since they have to merely need to advocate preserving the 
status quo; namely, the application to presumably discriminatory conduct of ISPs of ex post 
antitrust rules. Conversely, the proponents of network neutrality are called upon to persuade 
the European legislator of the necessity to adopt explicit ex ante regulatory measures. 
However, taking into consideration the power of public opinion upon the European decision-
making process, the perspectives of network neutrality legislation appear to be quite likely. 
Under these circumstances, consumer welfare constitutes an ultima ratio for future network 
neutrality debates in Europe.  
 Innovations and investments have another ‘golden share’ in this discussion. One of the 
best ways to attract new investors into the telecommunications market is to demonstrate its 
profitability, regulatory benevolence and potential for future evolvement. Over the last years 
in the case of the EU, and decades in the case of the US, the reference to efficiency often 
became the decisive factor during administrative scrutiny and judicial hearing. The post-
Chicago approach to the analysis of monopolist economic behaviour and its consequences for 
the market is currently applied upon an almost consensual agreement of all stakeholders. 
Which regulatory model -liberal or proactive- will create favourable preconditions for long 
term investments into the new technologies? The convincing answer to this question 
predetermines the attitude of regulatory authorities to network neutrality.  
 
Antitrust law is the most appropriate ex post regulatory watchdog for European 
telecommunications -particularly in the area of content / application gradation- because 
competition in the markets of internet services provisions is already secured and created by 
other EU regulatory tools; namely, the European regulatory framework for electronic 
communications and European audiovisual policy. These instruments provide a sufficient 
basis for opening markets and the additional network neutrality clauses will bring de facto 
regulatory duplication. If the aim of ex ante regulations is to establish a competitive 
environment in the markets and not to protect competitors, the network neutrality rule is 
unnecessary. Indeed, it does not guarantee horizontal competition between the ISPs, but only 
impose on them non-discrimination duties in relation to their vertical relations with content 
providers. The only ex ante regulatory tool which is really essential for establishing some 
competition between ISPs is the current European policy of local loop unbundling and bit 
stream access. However, these measures significantly infringe upon essential property rights 
of the network incumbents. Then again, since they are already established, one might as well 
take into account their positive aspects for the European economy. The legal and economic 
evaluation of these premises constitutes an important aspect of the present contribution.  
 
At the present stage of evolution of the telecommunications market, the networks 
represent the biggest ‘bottleneck’ for content distribution. Therefore, the attraction of 
investments into their deployment has to be seen as a major regulatory priority. Following the 
liberal postulate according to which softer regulation is a stronger regulation, the possibility to 
gain vast revenues from a ‘gatekeeper’ position is a substantial stimulus for new investors. 
The widespread argument of inefficiency of the networks duplication still plays an important, 
but no longer decisive, role in the modern telecommunications economy, especially taking 
into account the vigorous potential of the next generation wireless networks. This contribution 
demonstrates how exactly market failures can be effectively solved by antitrust procedures in 
the relevant areas.   
 
As a result of fast technological evolution and a growing juxtaposition in a number of 
communication areas, a draft of the new telecommunications framework has been launched at 
the beginning of 2000. Because of a rapid convergence among the three previously almost not 
at all interconnected sectors that are telecommunications, information technology and the 
media, the decision has been made to cover all of them through a single regulatory regime. 
This new framework included the regulation of both telecommunications and broadcasting 
aspects of communications, which previously had been regulated separately. However, the 
new regulatory regime of communications did not include either content services providing 
editorial control or information society services, which do not mainly consist in the 
transmission of signals on electronic communications networks. Apart from the explicit 
exclusion of audiovisual services, the new electronic communications proposal provided no 
coverage for the regulation of telecommunications equipment.  
 
The new regulatory framework came into force on 25 July 2003. Initially, this new 
package consisted of five directives: the Directive on a common regulatory framework 
(2002/21/EC), which lays out the main aims and procedures for an EU regulatory policy in the 
area of the provision of telecommunications services and networks; the Directive on access 
and interconnection (2002/19/EC), which regulates the access to and interconnection of 
networks on operators with significant market power; the Directive on the authorisation of 
Electronic Communications Networks and Services (2002/20/EC), a mechanism to establish a 
new system of general authorisation, under the provisions of which directive national 
regulatory authorities can no longer issue licenses but only establish a general authorisation 
for all telecommunications services; the Directive on universal service and user rights related 
to electronic communications networks and services (2002/22/EC), which provides a 
minimum level of telecommunications services to European consumers; and, finally, the 
Directive on privacy and electronic communications (2002/58/EC), stipulating the rules for 
protection of personal data and privacy.  
 
One of the main reasons to propose the framework was to harmonise the 
communications legislation. In addition to this packages, the Directive on competition in the 
markets for electronic communications services (2002/77/EC), the Decision on a regulatory 
framework for radio spectrum policy (678/2002/EC), the Decision on the minimum set of 
leased lines with harmonised characteristics and associated standards (2004/641/EC), the 
Decision establishing the European Regulators Group for Electronic Communications 
Networks and Services (2002/627/EC) and the Recommendation on relevant markets (C 
(2003) 497) have added latter on.  This paper does not review all the provisions of the relevant 
Regulatory Framework directives; instead, it focuses on specific aspects of the directives, 
which are related to network neutrality. 
 
At the current stage of the EC telecommunications development, one needs to 
acknowledge the general political will to move towards greater application of antitrust ex post 
European principles. This gesture is still far from the consensual recognition of the 
competition law rationale’s dominant position in the area of telecommunications. On the other 
hand, it might be interpreted as a manifestation of the completion of the first proactive 
regulatory stage in the infrastructural liberalisation.  
 
B. Compulsory infrastructure access 
 
In accordance with the current European regulatory model, compulsory access to the 
network infrastructure can be justified as a means to increase competition. The Directive on 
access and interconnection (2002/19/EC) obliges network operators with significant market 
power to meet reasonable requests for access to and use of networks elements and associated 
facilities, stipulating that such requests should only be refused on the basis of objective 
criteria such as technical feasibility or the need to maintain network integrity. In cases where 
access is refused, the aggrieved party may submit the case to the dispute resolutions procedure 
referred to in Articles 20 and 21 of the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC). However, national 
regulatory authorities are required to find a proper balance between the short-term interests of 
the new entrants and their incentives to invest in alternative facilities that will secure more 
competition in the long-term. 
 
Price control constitutes one of the most important regulatory instruments of 
compulsory access. In the markets where the competition is not well-developed, the 
incumbents are prohibited from imposing excessive prices and using price squeeze tools for 
eliminating competition. The Directive on access and interconnection gives to the national 
regulatory authorities the necessary rights for appropriate price control, such as cost 
accounting systems and undertaking an annual audit to ensure compliance with that 
procedure.  
 
It is noteworthy that the national regulatory authorities are not limited in their 
imposition of compulsory access provisions (exclusively) to situations where a company 
dominates the market.5 Such obligations go far beyond the ex post competition principles and 
along with liberalisation bring disincentives for incumbents to innovate and expand their 
networks.  
 
The new phase of telecommunications policy illustrates the Commission’s willingness 
to reassess the existing electronic communications regulatory framework. The main impetus 
for a reform came from the fast-changing nature of the telecommunications structure, from the 
deep convergence of various interrelated services -namely, the operation and deployment of 
the network infrastructure, access services, entertainment and content provision- and from the 
multilevel interdependence between them. 
 
During public consultations, many incumbent operators and some national authorities 
considered that the regulatory framework should foster more investment and they called for a 
major reform. Nevertheless, some have pleaded for either withdrawal of sector-specific 
regulation or regulatory holidays for major investments that made significant financial 
injections into structural renovation of their networks. 
 
The Proposal covers the area of common carriage services provision. In the 
Commission’s opinion, because of the fact that the fast technological progress significantly 
changed the conditions under which common carriage service rules operate, and keeping in 
mind a deep infrastructure deployment and establishment of alternative networks, these 
services need substantially less regulation from the member states. Conversely, in order to 
apply common European standards to such services, it is proposed that the common carriage 
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 Article 3 § 2 of the Directive on access and interconnection stipulates that “where, as a result of [...] market 
analysis, a national regulatory authority finds that one or more operators do not have significant market power on 
the relevant market, it may amend or withdraw the conditions with respect to those operators, in accordance with 
the procedures referred to in Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive)”.  
services obligations of the incumbents must be as proportionate and transparent as possible. 
The document proposes to introduce a deadline for reviewing national common carriage rules 
and give a spur to liberalise the national markets and introduce competition within newly 
opened segments of the telecommunications market.   
 
One of the most important and controversial proposals of the Commission is related to 
the provision of a universal service. The current EC regulations on universal services are 
based on the ‘classic’ model under which telecommunications companies may often provide 
both access to the network and voice communication services. In the Commission’s opinion, 
such a vertical integration model where the incumbent provides services of access to network 
and voice communications may harm -or, to put it in more appropriate terms, “not foster”- the 
competition within the internal market. As a result, it offers to introduce separate obligations 
on providers of access infrastructure and on providers of services. One of the main reasons for 
this legal transformation lies in the fact that the Commission foresees a rapidly growing 
interconnection of the different services and, consequently, some potential harm for the 
internal market as competition for the market would prevail over competition in the market.  
 
According to Article 3 of the Directive on competition in the markets for electronic 
communications services (2002/77/EC), “member states shall ensure that vertically integrated 
public undertakings which provide electronic communications networks and which are in a 
dominant position do not discriminate in favour of their own activities”. The Directive on 
access and interconnection (2002/19/EC) stipulates that telecommunications companies with 
significant market power are obliged to operate in accordance with the principle of non-
discrimination and ensure that undertakings with market power do not distort competition, 
especially where there are vertically integrated undertakings that supply services to 
undertakings with whom they compete on downstream markets. 
 
Hypothetically, the attempt of the Commission to regulate the telecommunications 
industry in such interventionist fashion might be justified by the goal to reach some efficiency 
gains for the European market. However, this policy may also lead to a decrement of the 
general level of legal certainty in the business environment and negatively reflect upon the 
intensions to invest into the future development of the infrastructure. As of today, it is still 
hard to predict the kind and methods of regulatory measures, which may be applied in order to 
impel the incumbents to give up certain part of their business. This appears even less likely if 
one keeps in mind that the control over the network allows them to carry on a wide range of 
legitimate economic leverages. 
 
The spirit of this proposal is not consistent with the broad economic studies in the area 
of ex post competition law, because the political, industrial and academic discourses in the 
antitrust domain reached almost unanimous consent upon economic efficiency of the 
vertically integrated business. The possible remedy for vertically integrated companies in 
competition law may be applied solely in the course of a merger’s approval. Vertically 
integrated companies may undergo an additional responsibility for abuse of their dominant 
position, but such a responsibility may not concern compulsory separation of the incumbent, 
since it is the consequence of behaviour but not the mere status of the company per se.  
 
C. Network neutrality in the new regulatory framework  
 
Another domain which the reformed regulatory framework proposes to cover is that of 
network neutrality. The term has been created in the US public debates by proponents of the 
current model of relations between telecommunications companies and providers of internet 
content. The rationale behind network neutrality is based upon a prohibition of ‘double 
charge’ for providing internet content to the end-users. The idea of launching the network 
neutrality movement is based upon the eventual threat for internet companies that aroused 
from the intentions of internet providers to establish prioritised services for users or 
companies who are willing to pay more for a substantial speed increment of data transmission.  
 
The Commission’s regulatory proposal maintains a quite ambivalent position in this 
regard and states that, “in Europe, the regulatory framework allows operators to offer different 
services to different customer groups, but does not allow those who are in a dominant position 
to discriminate between customers in similar circumstances”. The effective consequences of 
the distinction enshrined in this formula will, in all likelihood, be established exclusively on a 
case-by-case basis. The Proposal contains an important clause which empowers NRA to 
establish minimum quality levels for transmission of data via networks, particularly to avoid a 
situation of degradation of the quality of the service to an unacceptably low level. The 
Commission considers that any dispute raised among parties concerning the different 
interpretation of network neutrality principles should be resolved in accordance with the rules 
of good faith and refers to Article 5 § 1 of the Access Directive; according to which, “in an 
open and competitive market, there should be no restrictions that prevent undertakings from 
negotiating access and interconnection arrangements between themselves, in particular on 
cross-border agreements subject to the competition rules of the treaty”.  
 
The possibility of application of the provisions of non-discrimination in the context of 
network neutrality will depend on an infinitude of eventual interpretations of Article 10 § 2 of 
the Directive on access and interconnection (2002/19/EC); which stipulates that “obligations 
of non-discrimination shall ensure, in particular, that the operator applies equivalent 
conditions in equivalent circumstances to other undertakings providing equivalent services, 
and provides services and information to others under the same conditions and of the same 
quality as it provides for its own services, or those of its subsidiaries or partners”. 
 
The proponents of network neutrality interpret these provisions as a prohibition to 
prioritise the transmission of different services and applications, emphasising that in case of 
vertical integration of the infrastructure and content providers the conditions for premium 
traffic speed should be automatically transferred to other content providers. However, the 
incumbents would reasonably refer to the non-discriminatory character of premium speed 
services, since each company can receive access to such facilities under equivalent conditions. 
Hence, the abovementioned provisions of the Directive on access and interconnection regulate 
the relationship of network operators and the new entrants, electronic communications 
companies, who strive to operate within the same infrastructure. 
 
Even taking into account the highly growing convergence of technologies and 
applications, these conditions can apparently not be directly applied to the relations of 
network operators with content providers. The evolution and development of the concept of 
network neutrality, its ontological essence and legislative regulation, both in the US and EU, 
will be scrutinised below. 
 
The Commission analyses three potential scenarios for the development of the 
telecommunications regulatory framework: the removal or restriction of sector-specific 
regulation; the adoption of an ‘open access’ model for new network structure; and, lastly, no 
change to the regulatory framework.  
 
The first or ‘free market’ model is characterised by its eventual advantages for the 
current incumbents and a substantial increase in the level of economic predictability and legal 
certainty. Besides, the removal or restricted application of ex ante regulation may provide an 
incentive for long-term investment and make European markets more attractive to trans-
national capital. This option envisages the application in the telecommunications area of ex 
post competition policy rules without considerable sector specific measures.  
 
The biggest disadvantage of this regulatory approach lies in its disintegrative 
character. The removal of the uniform European regulation would authorise status quo in the 
European telecommunications, currently characterised not only by different levels of technical 
and structural development but also by diverse approaches with respect to liberalisation, often 
benefiting from a privileged (quasi-)national legal status granted by member states.  
 
In addition, the removal of ex ante regulation in a market where the incumbent 
operator benefits from a dominant position is likely to slow down the level of effective 
competition and to disadvantage consumers. The rapid growing importance of the 
communications area in digitally-oriented economies demonstrates that predictable long-term 
dominance does not constitute the exclusive condition for extensive investments in the new 
generation networks.  
 
The second option is diametrically opposed to the removal or restriction of sector-
specific regulations. It consists in the compulsory opening of access to the incumbent 
networks to all potential competitors, provided that they meet a certain number of established 
criteria. One version of this option envisages the structural separation, which the Commission 
foresees could in principle be imposed under competition law instruments. Until very 
recently, the most radical intervention of a regulatory authority in the commercial practice has 
been the institution of a compulsory licensing for dominant companies under Article 82 EC; 
that is, the essential facilities doctrine.  
 
There are many advocates and critics of this regulatory measure, both in governmental 
and industrial circles. In the scholarly literature, there is a virtually consensus upon the fact 
that the essential facility doctrine constitutes the ultimate frontier of the regulatory 
interference into the ‘societal sanctity’ of the private property domain. The most radical 
version of this institute provides the possibility of compulsory opening access to a piece of 
private property, which constitutes an industrial bottleneck, but only under the principle of 
limited and shared access. It is almost impossible to imagine how the tools of ex post 
regulation may be used to impel the incumbents to refuse to operate on the market of 
communications services, leaving them merely the possibility of technically servicing the 
networks. The only possible way to implement this idea is through ex ante regulatory 
requirements, obliging member states to grant the NRA the necessary competences to 
guarantee that network operator open access to all competitors by separating their 
infrastructure services from the provision of internet access. In all likelihood, the Commission 
considers this approach as merely theoretical and uses its argumentation for the purely 
methodological purposes of comprehension and analysis. For the sake of discussion, however, 
it is possible to simulate a situation similar to the famous rationale of the European courts 
with regard to parallel trading in intellectual property; namely, “the possession of property 
does not necessary correspond to its usage, which might have been restricted”. By analogy, 
holding the network does not entail an unreserved right to provide electronic communications 
services. Hence, technically speaking, certain requirements of registration or establishing and 
accounting separation of the incumbents might be launched by the Commission.  
 
The Commission is absolutely right in saying that the ‘open access’ model for new 
infrastructure investment works well in a tabula rasa situation, where there is no pre-existing 
network or Commission initiate proactive initiatives, using structural funds. This situation 
may be fully justified only under free-will but not under compulsory regulatory initiatives. 
The offered model has many advantages per se. Yet, because of the impossibility of 
separating the present-day infrastructure owners from the communications services, which 
often constitute the major part of their revenues, this idea remains mostly hypothetical.  
 
The third option considered by the Commission is the absence of any change to the 
regulatory framework. The current model is characterised by a high degree of predictability 
and harmonisation and its capability to successfully regulate the European 
telecommunications area has been proved in practice. For this reason, it would be appropriate 
to concentrate efforts on the adaptation of the regulatory framework to rapid technological 
changes and direct them on the coverage of new-arising domains, rather than propose radical 
conceptual changes. The Commission considers that this model is the most appropriate option 
and has thus proposed it in its associated Communication. 
 
III. European audiovisual policy  
 
A. Network neutrality context 
 
In regulatory terms, the concept of network neutrality is in-between. Its substance 
relates equally to infrastructure and content. The fundamental essence of network neutrality is 
based upon the principle of fair treatment of content by network operators. Unlike traditional 
broadcasting, data over IP streaming has no technical borders and can potentially cover a 
worldwide audience. Since the issues of content management relating to network neutrality 
may occur predominantly in the downstream market -namely, content destination, places of 
consumption of the content by customers-, the attention has to be paid to European regulatory 
instruments of content management.  
 
Regulation of audiovisual contents represents a substantial segment of the European 
communications policy. The main legislative document in this area is the Directive on the 
coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
member states concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities; “Television 
without Frontiers Directive” or TVWFD (89/552/EEC), from 1989. This document has been 
substantially updated in 1997. After some lengthy public debates and consultations, the 
Commission issued in 2005 and further amended in 2007 its proposal for Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive; AVMSD or Audiovisual Media Services Directive being a new title for 
TVWFD.6  
 
The original objective of TVWFD is the creation of appropriate conditions for the free 
movement of television transmission within the EC. Its primary scope included all forms of 
public broadcasting, except electronic communications services providing information 
services on on-demand basis.  
 
B. Single European TV market 
 
In terms of the liberation-integration-competition paradigm, the main aim of this 
document has definitely been the second one. By opposition to the US context, the 
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broadcasting industry in Europe is characterised by strong public elements. The state 
inheritance is either directly or at least implicitly present in all major European broadcasters 
and the whole consumer media culture in Europe. A genuine liberalisation of the broadcasting 
industry has never been on the European agenda. For this reason, TVWFD does not appear to 
concentrate any efforts on the liberalisation of the TV markets. Instead, it strives to integrate 
the different national regulatory environments into a single European model.  
 
In order to pursue this important mission, the Commission tries to eliminate any 
regulatory borders between the different member states. Hence, one of the key ideas of the 
TVWFD has been the prohibition for the member states to conduct any measures, which can 
restrict reception or retransmission of broadcast signal from other member states, apart from 
public safety, the promotion of culture and similar exceptional national needs.   
 
However, there are not enough political, economic and cultural preconditions for 
establishing a free market model for the TV industry in Europe. As is the case with the 
European regulation of the telecommunications infrastructure, the main efforts of the 
Commission are directed towards regulatory unification within the European internal market. 
The essence of harmonisation of the TV markets is based upon the subordination of national 
regulatory regimes to a pan-European one. Since the meta-task of European integration is 
based on the elimination of regulatory differences and economic borders between the member 
states, but by no means on erasing obstacles to an internal free market -as the internal market 
is not a free market-, the European audiovisual policy develops in parallel with the general 
objectives of the European integration. These regulatory roots of the European model of TV 
industry play a role in the present-day situation in relation to the production and distribution 
of European TV content. Without unnecessary oversimplifications, and fully taking into 
account all cultural, linguistic, behavioural and esthetical particularities of Europeans, there 
are enough evidences to conclude that there exists a direct relation between the strong 
regulatory character of the European TV industry and its poor commercial performance both 
in the world at large and the domestic markets.   
 
TVWFD covers a broad range of issues, related to the production, transmission and 
reception of content in the EC. Its adoption has been originally stimulated by fast 
technological developments in the TV industry. In combination with the firm intention to 
establish a single European market, these prerequisites became decisive for the initiation of 
this legislative measure. Initially adopted in 1989, it has been amended in 1997 because of the 
further development of the audiovisual sector; in particular, in the area of satellite TV, 
marketing-oriented business models, interactive technologies and future deployment of cable 
infrastructure.   
 
In 2007, EU is still revising TVWFD. Under the new title of Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive, it is called for providing an effective regulatory tool for content production 
and distribution in the new digital age.  
 
Since the adoption of TVWFD in 1989 and its substantial amendment in 1997, 
electronic technologies have substantially expanded, leading the Commission to initiate in 
2002 a legislative review of TVWFD. It has been officially launched by launching a proposal 
for the elaboration of a program for the modernisation of rules on audiovisual services and a 
timetable for future actions. The Commission organised an extensive public consultation 
campaign. As a result of this hearing, many research and analytical programs and seminars 
have been organised by the Commission from 2003 until 2007. Finally, in 2005, the 
Commission officially adopted a legislative proposal for the revision of TVWFD, with some 
relevant amendments in 2007.  
 
This document stresses the importance of the European audiovisual environment, 
based on principles of pluralism, cultural diversity and consumer protection. The Commission 
offers in this proposal to guarantee the independence of national regulators in the media 
sector; which essentially means to strive to provide the necessary tools for stronger regulatory 
powers. 
 
IV. Conclusions and openings for further research  
 
The aim of this contribution has been to give to a descriptive presentation of the 
current European regulatory framework in the areas of electronic communications and 
audiovisual policy. By analysing the relevant EC directives, it strived to put the existing 
model of ex ante regulation into the context of the network neutrality debates; with the general 
objective to provide a clear-cut overview of the European state of affairs in the areas related to 
network neutrality. The purpose of the overall project is not to present the mono-semantic 
meaning of this multidimensional problem, but rather to explore the nodular issues of the 
academic debates over network neutrality in the United States, to correct mistakes and 
afterwards to offer effective, theoretically adjusted solutions for the existing and new 
telecommunications operators in the European markets. The nature of argumentation is 
mainly legal and, to a lesser extent, economic or societal.  
 
Departing from a conception favouring ex post regulation of network neutrality, one 
can demonstrate why exactly Europe does not deserve an explicit mention in the ex ante 
telecommunications framework. It goes without saying that any sort of instrumentalisation of 
explored arguments should be rejected and all pros and cons analysed without any partiality. 
This paper opens the path to the provision of an alternative approach to the network neutrality 
dilemma in the European context. One can expect a priori to give a positive answer to the 
question submitted in the title of the present proposal; that is, whether Europe should trust in 
antitrust.  
 
From an academic perspective, network neutrality is an interdisciplinary phenomenon. 
It can be explored under its economic, legal, societal, technical and political dimensions. By 
applying political philosophy’s argumentation and reasoning, one can attempt to prove that 
content prioritisation is, by far, not the same as content discrimination. In addition, when 
exploring the existing US and EU case-law related to telecommunications, intellectual 
property and antitrust areas, one can provide economic, societal and (most importantly) legal 
argumentation for ISPs to content / application prioritisation and emphasise the relevancy of 
the ex post antitrust instruments for the companies which abuse or misuse their ‘natural’ right 
to prioritise the content.  
 
The history of public debates in the United States showed a big potential for the 
network neutrality proponents to attract consumers. Their vivid rhetoric together with constant 
reference to fundamental freedoms manages to create a powerful public tool for the promotion 
of this idea. It is, therefore, important to explore and evaluate the most successful techniques, 
applied by the proponents of network neutrality. At this point, one can only foresee that the 
existence of extra-speed possibility for premium internet services is not likely to degrade the 
other applications and that higher data-speed option gives to consumers an opportunity to 
benefit from the great variety of internet services, particularly from those related to live-
streaming. The rest is the object of a much wider project. 
